He was magnetic. He was the smartest person in any room. He was the best-liked person you’ve ever known. Sure, he was a fine husband and father; but he was an incomparable teacher and mentor.
Tuesday, May 30, 2006
Monday, May 29, 2006
In today's NYT article on the new owners of the Philadelphia dailies, KQ Seelye beautifully illustrates the disconnect between the most highly professionalized journalists (herself being one of them) and anyone even casually interested in the way journalism actually operates. Interviewing the new chief owner, who comes from an entrepreneurial background and whom she expects to have trouble adjusting to the culture of journalism, she opines:
Some aspects of the culture are still unfamiliar. He was describing himself as a "zealous advocate" and added, "I hope our reporters will be zealous advocates for what they're trying to do as well." When it was pointed out that reporters are not supposed to be advocates for anything, he amended his comment.
"Zealous advocates for finding the truth," he said. "They shouldn't just be willing — if they believe in something, they should fight for it."
And yes, aren't journalists supposed to be zealous advocates for finding the truth? And for healthy public scrutiny? And for fairness and intelligence in public discourse? Just as judges are supposed to be zealous advocates of the justice system, even while maintaining their neutrality on any particular case. And of course Seelye herself is being a zealous advocate for a model of professional neutrality in her own apparently cool and detached ridicule of this entrepreneur, Brian Tierney.
Anyone even casually interested in journalism would point these things out. But somehow the most highly professionalized journalists can't notice them.
Thursday, May 25, 2006
I'm in the midst of Sean Wilentz's massive The Rise of American Democracy. I will be for a few days more, I'm sure. It's a real doorstop. Not a page turner, but, just when I'm ready to shelve it, I run across an elegant description of something that always puzzled me, like the diplomacy over the Haitian Revolution or the Panic of 1819, and decide to keep at it. A very sound book. It will not dazzle you with new insights, and in fact is resolutely conventional, from its opening invocation of Arthur Schlesinger's Age of Jackson on; once again you will believe that history is past politics.
One of the reasons I keep on with the book is that it's so involved with the history of the press. Anyone familiar with Wilentz's other great book, Chants Democratic, will expect this. His history is deeply informed by and has a deep appreciation of the newspapers of the early republic. But he does not foreground them, and takes it for granted that they were powerful organs of influence without necessarily 'mediating' politics in any significant way. This surprises me especially because Wilentz is relying on scholarship by people like Jeff Pasley (a much better writer, by the way) that does just that. Pasley argues that it was the printer editors of the early Republic who invented popular politics. I think he stretches the point a bit, but is essentially correct. I put in another way in my own work. The press represented public opinion, which was the indispensable element of generating political legitimacy, and hence political power.
This is why people got so bent out of shape about marginal political movements from the Democratic-Republican societies in the 1790s to the abolitionist press. These were novel attempts to hijack the representation of public opinion away from its authorized mechanisms--the legislatures, in the first case, and the parties in the second. Wilentz comes tantalizingly close to making a marvelous argument about anti-abolitionism when he notes the earlier appearance of antislavery activism. The argument he could and should make is that the reaction against antislavery did not arise as a reaction against the RISE of antislavery (As Leonard Richards and Larry Ratner have it) but as an expression of the rise of the Jacksonian party system as a regulator of the representation of public opinion. Whipping up an antiabolitionist hysteria legitimated the power of the party press.
The other counterintuitive argument you might make here involves the popularity of the press. The political press of the early Republic was 'popular' not because a lot of people read it but because it stood for the people, or stood in the place of the people in relation to the transaction of power.
OK, I sound mystifying there. But ask yourself this. Why were the founding fathers so worked up about the Democratic Republican societies? It's because they knew exactly what those little groups could do. The founding fathers themselves had made their merchants' committees and mechanics' committees and non-intercourse associations and committees of correspondence, and they had a name for what their groups had done: Revolution. Simply existing as groups representing public opinion had been the first step in the Revolution. There's nothing so abstract or mystifying about that.
The title of this post comes from an old story about a debate between Leo Ribuffo and AM Schesinger on the origins of the Cold War. Schlesinger, the story goes, gets pissed off and asks Ribuffo, 'How old were you when the Truman Doctrine was announced?' and Ribuffo replied, ....
Wednesday, May 24, 2006
Tom Rosenstiel made the point first:
Rosenstiel also compared the ownership to a sports team's and noted that the motivation for team owners was rarely financial. "They do it to be a player in town or to be a celebrity," he said. "They do it after they have made their money and are looking for something more exhilarating or adventurous." ('With Local Control, and Uncommon Story in Philadelphia,' by Paul Nussbaum, in today's Inquirer, via Romenesko.)
He's more polite about it too.
Today's NYT reports on the sale of the two major dailies in Philadelphia to a group of local investors. The Inquirer and the Daily News were owned by Knight-Ridder, whose stockholders forced a sale this year to McClatchy, who in turn has been auctioning off the newspapers that don't fit into its business plans. To newspaper readers, the Inquirer is the most important of the Knight-Ridder newspapers, and, in the days when prestige counted for something in the industry, would have been the most valuable property. The most important information in the NYT article by KQ Seeley comes at the end:
Knight Ridder's profit margin in 2004 was 19.3 percent, about average for the industry. Morgan Stanley, which examined the company before its sale, said the profit margin in Philadelphia was 9 percent, while company executives said it was somewhat higher, even with severance payments last year as the papers trimmed their staffs.
Both papers have been losing circulation at rates that exceed the industry average.
Circulation at The Inquirer, once the jewel of the Knight Ridder chain, fell to 350,457, a drop of 5 percent, for the six-month period ended March 31, compared with the period the year before. Circulation at The Daily News dropped 9.4 percent, to 116,590.
The average circulation loss for the industry was 2.5 percent.
In other words, even with the falling circulation, and taking significant one-time losses, both newspapers together turned a fair profit last year; no doubt without the one-time losses, the Inquirer's profit was about the industry average, approaching 20%. Why doesn't McClatchy want this newspaper?
The group buying it consists of ten local owners, mostly businesses, with the lead buyer being an active Republican and someone news professionals are wary of. Wouldn't it be nice if the journalists themselves could buy up properties like this? (I'd include the Sun-Times, which is always on the market somehow) Wouldn't it be nice if some kind of public entity could make that possible? These owners are going to treat the paper either like a sports franchise--an ego trip occasion--or like a subsidiary to their main businesses; I predict it will be on the market again soon. Pay attention to the countries where newspapers still work!
Tuesday, May 23, 2006
Norway leads the world in per capita consumption of newspapers and, they tell me, coffee. I'm willing to believe both these things. Now I gotta wonder why.
Not about coffee. There are two seasons in Norway: the dark season and the light season. In the light season, it's daylight for eighteen to twenty hours, and you never get enough sleep, so you want to keep strong coffee at hand. In the dark season, it's correspondingly dark, and cold, and you want to keep strong coffee at hand.
But what about newspapers? Norway can't possibly be a world leader in the production of NEWS, and the newspapers sort of show that. There just isn't enough politics or crime, most days, to fill a good newspaper, and there aren't enough celebrities or spectacles either.
But there are plenty of READERS. It's a nation of tireless readers--cf comments on the dark season--and the newspapers are rather literate by world standards. Hallin and Mancini, in their book Comparing Media Systems, note that there is a very clear correlation between levels of newspaper readership today and levels of literacy at the end of the nineteenth century. An interesting fact.
There's also plenty of MONEY. That's because of the general wealth of the country and because of the way the social compact distributes it. One of the ways it distributes wealth is in the form of subsidies to newspapers.
But my colleague at Bergen Martin Eide remarks that it's also the invention in the past thirty years of a hybrid journalism that combines tabloid forms with sophisticated cultural and political commentary. Similar formal innovations seem to me also to be the reason for the vibrancy of news media in the younger democracies of southen Europe, like Italy and Spain, which still have far lower levels of readership.
Now this formula is exportable. Are media in the US paying attention? I think not, and I think the reason is their far greater dependence on advertising income. For them, more readers doesn't necessarily mean more money or more stability.
Instead, US newspapers innovate in this direction by spinning off free youth papers, like the Chicago Tribune's ineffable RedEye. This ain't innovation as much as it's line extension.
Monday, May 22, 2006
One feature of a corrupt public sphere is sloganizing. As in 'she's a tax and spend liberal.' Or as in 'we tried throwing money at the problem.' So in a complex debate like the one about net neutrality, it's interesting to see the jockeying over which side gets to claim 'freedom' in some fashion in its slogans. I'm rooting for the good guys, of course, who are calling net neutrality 'the internet's first amendment.' This encapsulates the argument nicely.
It also begs a question about the first amendment. It has happened that the first amendment, which originally was meant to protect the rights of ordinary citizens to participate in the public sphere, has come to be owned by 'the press,' which wields in like a fetish.
Or, to paraphrase Anatole France, the majestic equality of first amendment law, which prevents the government from infringing on the right of the poor as well as the rich to sell your children Disney products.
But, like I say, I'm just dabbling with this one, and not following it closely. It would make a good study in the politics of the social contruction of a technological system.
Sunday, May 21, 2006
I've been silent for a couple of weeks, dealing with departmental politics and learning to read Norwegian newspapers. More on these shortly, perhaps. But at the same time I've been paying casual attention to the debate about net neutrality in the blogosphere.
Net neutrality is exactly the kind of issue that the blogosphere is best suited for. It is a natural test of the capacities of the blogosphere for deliberation and policy influence. It might be fun to do a formal study of it. Is anyone working on that?
Here's my take. It's an issue that suits the experiences and enthusiasms of bloggers. We all know something about the vagaries of internet access, and most of us have enough history with the web to remember its less stratified days and be able to project a far more stratified future. Furthermore, most bloggers, or at least most political bloggers, have an instinct about the web as a public space. So just in terms of motivation and personal interest, the concept of net neutrality means a lot to most of us before we even bother to learn what exactly it means.
But it's also the kind of issue where the expert knowledges that circulate in the blogosphere readily come into play. It's similar to Rathergate, where suddenly you heard from a lot of people who knew a lot about the IBM Selectric typewriter. This allows the complexities of the issue to overtake initial sloganeering.
Bloggers have taken sides, but not strictly along party lines--another of the signal features of blogosphere discourse at its best. Some lefties maintained their neutrality, and some righties showed great suspicion of the corporate interests at play. The issue touches a bedrock libertarianism and egalitarianism that the space and technology of blogging cultivate.
But as the debate has progressed, the left-right lines have reformed, I think. Lefties who were once agnostic are now persuaded, for instance. And the lobbying machinery of the net has swung into action.
As the blogosphere's discussion has turned from deliberation to mobilization, has its influence changed? About this I'm not sure. Perhaps its influence was always going to be, in the final analysis, just another form of lobbying. This would indicate that it's not a truly new public space, and that it has influence only when it works through the old channels of phone calls to Congressional reps, or cups of coffee with staffers.
Thinking this through over the next few days....
Friday, May 05, 2006
I wrote a few years ago that the web has deformed newspapers. By deformed I meant specifically that it had taken away the form of the news, particularly the overall form, the mapping of the world that both a daily newspaper front page and a network news show execute. On the web, the hierarchy of stories is muted, the interplay of items on the page is eliminated, and the voice of the newspaper is much harder to hear. Same, but less so, with broadcast news outfits.
For years the Times has had all its matter (except the ads, which I don't read anyway) up on the web, and I read it often enough in that fashion, though I far prefer the paper edition. When I read the web version, I spend about 12 minutes with it; on the paper edition it's three or four times as much time I'll spend and I'll come away feeling like I've engaged in an important informational ritual. I'll feel in the know.
Not with the old web version. From time to time I would try to piece together the shape of the print newspaper, but without much luck. It was like radio to me. Headlines.
With the new version, the first thing I noticed was how much easier it is to draw up the content of the printed version in roughly the same form as in the print paper. It's still headlines, but it's the right ones. The second thing I noticed is how much friendlier the home page is. It begins to give some of the form back to the news. It's still not there, but it's a great leap forward.
The other interesting thing is the flirtation with blogging. I've been saying in lectures here and there that the new tools of the news (blogging's one of them) have not yet been turned into a "journalism." This is not to engage in the argument about whether blogging is journalism. Of course, why not? It's just to say that the rules of blog/journ have not yet been formulated. Now the times is going to do it. I spoke with one of their correspondents who'd been recruited for the blog experiment a few months ago. (He insisted that his thing was a website, not a blog, and of course, why not?) I asked him what kinds of journalistic standards would govern NYT's bloggers. He said they said they were open to discussion. So let's see. The outcome is going to be the invention of a journalism for bloggers; there's no doubt about that. But if it's going to work, it'll have to bless the subjectivity of the blogger, which is the whole point of the genre.
But apparently only some kinds of scandal. There is a big splash over a Kennedy's car wreck today, but relatively little over an unfolding corruption scandal that has tracks leading deep into the woods of the intelligence community. Josh Marshall makes the argument:
And, while the Kennedy story is 'newsy' it doesn't really have any greater policy implications. And the public trust implications are minor. The Wilkes-Watergate-Hooker story, on the other hand, is both. It's salacious, which the press loves. And it's also directly tied to crooks ripping off taxpayers, probably allowing our service members abroad to have shoddy equipment or defense dollars going to worthless projects.
So is it that the press is just not willing to invest in the more complex story? With the Kennedy scandal, the story comes pre-packaged, and you just fill in the names. With the Hookergate story, you would have to actually crib a lot of the material from Talkingpointsmemo. No, seriously, you would have to educate your readers and viewers. It's not that the press isn't willing to do that; the press doesn't seem to have the capacity to do that. It takes another arm of publicity to cultivate the audience in the first place, perhaps.
Or there's the other argument. The press doesn't seem highly motivated to get these Republican crooks, for whatever reason. Not as intellectually satisfying, but not to be dismissed out of hand.