Iran and unpublished thinking.
Discourses are like onions, in that there always seems to be a deeper layer but you never reach a core. (A bad metaphor--I think it was the one William James used to describe a colleague's personality--because it doesn't do justice to the onion, which does have a sweet and tangy core, though it's similar to the rest of the onion--unlike say a peach pit.)
There's always a deeper layer beyond the one you've hooked into. In anything. In previous posts, I've pondered this fact in regard to the war in Iraq, where, obviously, the mot public discourse, the "confirmation in the form of a mushroom cloud" one, was at least two discourses removed from the discourse that mattered, which was in turn a field of encounter between several other discourses. So beyond the line peddled to the rubes (sadly, in Cincinnati, where Bush delivered his major address), there was another played to the reporters by, say, Scooter Libby, and then another played against that grain by other sources to other reporters like, say, Sy Hersh. And then beyond that there was the Oval office and 10 Downing Street, locations we now have learned something about through leaked memoes and court filings. And beyond that? No core. An ever receding landscape of privileged discourses, all contesting in the Oval office and elsewhere.
So why did we go to war in Iraq? Was there a real reason? Probably not. Probably we went to war in Iraq because it was an option made available by the overlap of a series of privleged discourses. The Oil discourse, the Stability discourse, the Democracy discourse, the Israel discourse. That, plus the will to do it--resident in the Oval office for longer than George Bush--and the realization in the US and elsewhere that the sanctions regime had failed.
And of course the other nations of the world had something to do with this too, though many of them now deny it. Germany officially opposed the war but shared intelligence. Other nations joined the coalition of the willing but now claim they were snookered. Some nations kept a hand in, like Norway, without really signing on. But by and large they authorized it.
Now Iran. Can the same thing happen? Sure. The overlapping consensus in favor of a military strike exists in some protean form, and the world is beginning to appear willing enough. The blogosphere is arguing today whether the will exists in the Oval office. Sure it does. That button is begging to be pushed. What doesn't exist is the capacity for an invasion.
Would a military strike be a bad idea? Yes. It always is. Should an opposition form to try to stop it? Yes, most certainly. Is there political capital to be made by opposing a military strike? No. Not at all.
Discourses are like onions, in that there always seems to be a deeper layer but you never reach a core. (A bad metaphor--I think it was the one William James used to describe a colleague's personality--because it doesn't do justice to the onion, which does have a sweet and tangy core, though it's similar to the rest of the onion--unlike say a peach pit.)
There's always a deeper layer beyond the one you've hooked into. In anything. In previous posts, I've pondered this fact in regard to the war in Iraq, where, obviously, the mot public discourse, the "confirmation in the form of a mushroom cloud" one, was at least two discourses removed from the discourse that mattered, which was in turn a field of encounter between several other discourses. So beyond the line peddled to the rubes (sadly, in Cincinnati, where Bush delivered his major address), there was another played to the reporters by, say, Scooter Libby, and then another played against that grain by other sources to other reporters like, say, Sy Hersh. And then beyond that there was the Oval office and 10 Downing Street, locations we now have learned something about through leaked memoes and court filings. And beyond that? No core. An ever receding landscape of privileged discourses, all contesting in the Oval office and elsewhere.
So why did we go to war in Iraq? Was there a real reason? Probably not. Probably we went to war in Iraq because it was an option made available by the overlap of a series of privleged discourses. The Oil discourse, the Stability discourse, the Democracy discourse, the Israel discourse. That, plus the will to do it--resident in the Oval office for longer than George Bush--and the realization in the US and elsewhere that the sanctions regime had failed.
And of course the other nations of the world had something to do with this too, though many of them now deny it. Germany officially opposed the war but shared intelligence. Other nations joined the coalition of the willing but now claim they were snookered. Some nations kept a hand in, like Norway, without really signing on. But by and large they authorized it.
Now Iran. Can the same thing happen? Sure. The overlapping consensus in favor of a military strike exists in some protean form, and the world is beginning to appear willing enough. The blogosphere is arguing today whether the will exists in the Oval office. Sure it does. That button is begging to be pushed. What doesn't exist is the capacity for an invasion.
Would a military strike be a bad idea? Yes. It always is. Should an opposition form to try to stop it? Yes, most certainly. Is there political capital to be made by opposing a military strike? No. Not at all.
posted by jnerone at 5:29 AM
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